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This report was commissioned by the Khalsa Academies Trust in April 2021 in response to two 
Termination Notices delivered to Sikh schools. We have been asked to independently and fairly 
investigate these Termination Notices and the circumstances, contexts and decision-making 
processes surrounding them. We acknowledge here that we are drawing heavily on Harriet 
Read and Vera Chapiro Bernal’s initial report into Faith Schools, delivered in August 2020. This is 
especially true of the initial sections. Where sections are in blue boxes, this is taken verbatim 




1.1.1 Faith schools 
‘Faith schools,’ i.e. those which are designated as having ‘a faith character’, are defined by the 
UK government, with extreme brevity, as being exempt from the religion and belief provisions 
of The Equality Act (2010) and able to prioritise admissions to members of their own religion in 
their subscription criteria, but they must (with the exception of grammar schools) offer a place 
to any child where this is not an issue. Faith schools can have different staffing policies, can 
decide their own Religious Education curricula, and can have different models of ownership of 
their school buildings. Additionally, those outside state control such as faith academies do not 
have to teach the National Curriculum and can further set their own admissions policies 
(Gov.uk, online, 2021a).  
 
Long, Danechi & Loft (2019) note that the Government funds many different types of faith 
school and that around 34% (n=6802) of state-funded mainstream schools in England have such 
a faith designation, the majority of which have a Christian faith designation, but there is also a 
growing number of schools with other faith designations – including Muslim, Jewish and Sikh. 
 
37% of state funded mainstream primaries have a faith designation, and faith schools comprise 
18% of all state funded mainstream secondaries. Church of England schools are the most 
common type among primary schools (26% of all primaries); Roman Catholic schools the most 
common at secondary level (9%). Non-Christian faith schools remain very much in the minority: 
combined, they comprise less than 1% of all state-funded mainstream schools. However, the 
number of these schools is increasing. Long, Danechi & Loft (2019) state that between January 
2007 and September 2017 the number of Jewish schools increased by 12, Muslim schools by 
24, Sikh schools by 10, and all 7 of the Hindu schools have opened during this period. Read and 
Bernal (2020) give a more comprehensive overview of faith schools and their history within UK 










*It is of note, and pertinent to this research and its findings, that no such Memorandum of 
Understanding exists between the DfE and other faith bodies. In the specific case of the 
Khalsa Academies Trust, then, there was no such expectation on the DfE to share information, 
nor to seek the consent of faith representatives before the decisions to convert or re-broker 




The 2016 Education and Adoption Act gave the DfE new powers to intervene more rapidly in 
schools rated ‘inadequate’ or ‘coasting’ by Ofsted. This made it possible to speed up the process 
of converting failing comprehensive schools into academies by circumventing local consultation 
and objections, that would have previously delayed the process (DfE 2016). The effects of this 
act on faith schools was clarified by Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), associated with the 
Act, passed between the Department for Education (DfE) and the Roman Catholic Church and 
the Church of England (DfE 2016). 
 
These MoU put in place a high level of cooperation and communication between the DfE and 
RC and CofE Dioceses. The DfE, represented by Regional School Commissioners (RSCs), is 
expected to share information with Dioceses at the earliest opportunity about concerns about 
underperforming schools, maintained church schools converting to academy status, 
intervention in inadequate local authority maintained church schools, re-brokerage of 
underperforming RC and CofE academies, and termination notice or termination warning 
notices to RC and CofE academies. Consent of diocesan representatives is needed for: 
 
• the conversion of RC and CofE local authority-maintained schools to academy status 
• RC and CofE schools to become sponsors. 
• the finalising of a solution to interventions in Inadequate local authority-maintained RC 
and CofE schools 
• The re-brokerage of underperforming RC or CofE academies 
 
The purpose of these MoU is to preserve the faith designation of a school, and to prevent any 






1.2 Research Aims 
 
Based on the previous research of Read and Bernal (2020), which looked more generally at the 
rates of ‘Inadequate’ ratings given to faith schools and the subsequent number that were issued 
with Minded to Terminate Notices, Termination Warning Notices and actual Termination 
Notices, the specific aims of the research presented in this report were: 
 
1. To investigate the circumstances around the decisions to issue Termination Notices to 
two Sikh schools after Ofsted Inadequate ratings;  
 
2. To investigate whether these decisions were comparable to decisions made regarding 
other faith schools from different religious faiths following ‘Inadequate’ ratings and the 
issuing of Minded to Terminate Notices or Termination Warning Notices;  
 
3. To investigate whether re-brokerage or conversion are reasonable solutions in these 






Initially we conducted a literature search, using Google, EPPI, ERIC and WoK. It is 
immediately apparent that there is very little literature in this field. The combined search 
terms “Ofsted AND termination” brought up nothing on ERIC, EPPI or the WoK, and nothing 
useful on Google Scholar – three items to do with Nurseries, and two further papers from 
2002 and 2003. Changing the search to include “re-broke*” gave eight ‘hits’ on Google, two 
of which were useful, but nothing further on the other sites. Much of this report, then, uses 
material from the Department for Education (DfE) and other government agencies, rather 
than academic sources, although reference is made to what little extant literature there is. 
 
We have drawn heavily on the previous research of Read & Bernal (2020) and their analysis 
on linking data between DfE data on school performance, schools’ individual Ofsted reports 
and letters sent to academies regarding poor performance, using data collected by the DfE 
and Ofsted, and made available to the public. The way the study linked data allowed for the 
“creation of a unique dataset on which descriptive statistical analysis could be performed” 
(Read & Bernal, 2020 p7). 
 
We have used this dataset to create the tables of data presented in sections 2.2 and 2.4.1, and 
used this as the basis for some of our areas of study. Further, we have compared the publicly 
available documentation on a sample of the faith schools rated Inadequate by Ofsted and 
subsequently issued with a Minded to Terminate Notice (MTN) or a Termination Warning 
Notice (TWN) in the period September 2017-August 2020. This has allowed us to draw 




2 Inadequate faith schools: re-brokerage and conversion 
 




The definition of an ‘inadequate, special measures’ judgement is that the school is “failing to 
give its pupils an acceptable standard of education, and the persons responsible for leading, 
managing or governing the school are not demonstrating the capacity to secure the necessary 
improvement in the school” (School Inspection Handbook, January 2018). 
 
 




Where poor or inadequate performance or weaknesses in safeguarding, governance or financial 
management is identified by an Ofsted inspection, the DfE can notify the academy via the 




Ofsted inspects all maintained and academy schools in England, in line with the relevant 
inspection framework. It also inspects other services, including childcare, social care and further 
education. Ofsted introduced a new Education Inspection Framework in September 2019 and 
the new framework has a greater focus on the quality and breadth of the curriculum. The impact 
this intensified focus will have on the Ofsted inspections of faith schools is an aspect worthy of 
continued monitoring and research. 
 
As it stands, there are four overall judgements that Ofsted can reach about schools: Outstanding; 
Good; Requires Improvement; and Inadequate. Inadequate is subdivided into two more 
categories: serious weaknesses; or requiring special measures. In line with the Education and 
Adoption Act 2016, an overall effectiveness grading of Inadequate for a maintained school 
triggers the mandatory issue of an academy order. For an academy, being graded Inadequate 
could result in a transfer to another academy trust if appropriate actions are not taken. 
The Regional Schools Commissioners ( RSCs ) act on behalf of the Secretary of State for 
Education and are accountable to the National Schools Commissioner. Each RSC is 
supported by a headteacher board. ... intervening in maintained schools judged to be 
inadequate by Ofsted by providing them with support from a strong sponsor.  
 








The text in italics describes the issuing of formal Notices that outline why the school is causing 
concern and/or breaking its funding agreement. As a result of the Education and Adoption Act 
2016, regardless of the terms in an academy’s funding agreement, the Regional Schools 
Commissioner (on behalf of the Secretary of State) can terminate the funding agreement of an 
academy that has been judged Inadequate. There are three levels of response, and RSCs can 
use whichever of these they feel is the most appropriate (see Gov.uk, online, 2021b), but they 
tend to follow in a prescribed sequence. 
 
The least severe of these notices are pre-warning notices called Minded to Terminate Notices 
(MTN). These require a response within 15 days and are sent to schools where special measures 
are required to be taken by the academy or the academy requires significant improvement. The 
required response must detail how a Trust will make necessary changes. If the Regional Schools 
Commissioner has reason to think that the school does not have the capacity to make 
improvements, or this is proven to be the case after subsequent Ofsted Section 8 monitoring 
inspections, the government has the power to close the school or appoint additional directors. 




A Termination Warning Notice is the next step, where the RSC feels that the response to the 
MTN has been inadequate. This is more severe, with a clear understanding that if changes are 
not implemented immediately and with immediate effect, the school is under threat of losing 
their funding from the government, leading to closure or re-brokerage. Example texts from two 
TWNs from 2019 and 2020 are given below: 
 
RSC Core Functions  
 
1. Intervening with under-performing academies and free schools to ensure that high 
quality support is commissioned to improve them quickly 
 
Tackling educational underperformance in academies and free schools  
The RSC is responsible for holding academy trusts to account where academies or free schools are 
underperforming. In cases where formal intervention measures are required, RSCs will take action 
to address underperformance and bring about rapid improvement. This may include 
commissioning appropriate support, issuing a pre-warning notice or warning notice or by 
terminating the academy’s funding agreement, and identifying a new sponsor to take on 
responsibility for the academy where this is necessary. 
 
DfE, Regional Schools Commissioners’ decision making framework, October 2020, p7. 
 
As the Regional Schools Commissioner acting on behalf of the Secretary of State, I need to 
be satisfied that X Academy can achieve rapid and sustained improvement. If I am not 







Should the RSC feel that the school and its leadership lacks the capacity to implement the 
changes that are required, even after the TWN, then the school will be issued with a final 
Termination Notice. This notifies the school, its governors and the Local Authority that the 
school is to cease operating as it has been. These letters are also copied to the National Schools 




I received an Ofsted notification dated (date) confirming that ******** Academy was judged 
to be inadequate and requires special measures. The Trust was issued with a minded to 
terminate letter, under clause 5B of the SFA, on (date) following which you were given an 
opportunity to provide information to evidence a plan of improvement. This process and 
information provided in response to the minded to terminate letter has now been superseded 
by the inadequate judgment. On the basis of the Ofsted judgment, I am now issuing this 
Termination Warning Notice under s2A because I have concerns that the trust does not have 
the capacity to make rapid and sustained improvement, particularly in relation to ********. 
As I have received an Ofsted notification dated (date) confirming that ******** was judged to 
be inadequate and requires special measures, it is my responsibility to consider whether to 
terminate the funding agreement. As part of this process, I will consider any written 
representations you wish to make on the matter. As such, I would be grateful if you could 
provide me with any representations by (date). 
I have considered carefully the actions which the Trust has taken in order to secure the 
necessary school improvement capability and am not convinced that they are sufficiently 
robust: 
 There is no evidence of how the Trust is securing the additional capacity to ensure the 
necessary improvements in the school take place, for example by bringing in other 
external capacity apart from the SIP. 
 There is no evidence of a plan to address Ofsted’s main points regarding strengthening 
leadership and management, and holding leaders to account. 
 
Consequently, in accordance with section 2A and on behalf of the Secretary of State, I am 
issuing you with written notice to terminate the Funding Agreement with the ******** 
Academy Trust, which I expect to take effect on (date) 
 
As you know, ministers have made an in-principle decision to close the Academy, and we have 
been holding a listening period to gain the views of stakeholders. The listening period ends on 
(date). 
 
In this context, I would emphasise that termination of a school funding agreement does not 
necessarily signal closure of the Academy, and I am still considering whether the school could 




Table 1 displays a faith breakdown of the number of state-funded schools and academies 
graded as Inadequate in the period September 2017 - August 2020. The chart shows that of 535 
schools rated Inadequate, 133 schools had a religious character designation. This included 85 
Christian (excluding Roman Catholic) schools, 45 Roman Catholic schools, 2 Jewish schools, 1 
Muslim and 2 Sikh schools. No state-funded Hindu, Orthodox Jewish, Quaker or other minority 
religious schools inspected from September 2017 to August 2020 were found to be Inadequate 
by Ofsted. 
 






Christian Jewish Sikh Muslim Hindu 
2017-2018 173 21 34 1 1 1 0 
2018-2019 157 17 40 1 0 0 0 
2019-2020 70 7 11 0 1 0 0 
Totals 400 45 85 2 2 1 0 
  
 
2.3 Academy re-brokerage 
 
2.3.1 Maintained schools 
Once an Inadequate grading has been given, In the case of maintained schools judged to be 
Inadequate, Regional Schools Commissioners (RSCs) issue schools with a Directive Academy 
Order (DAO). This order requires the school to close and re-open as a sponsor-led academy. 
This is known as ‘conversion.’ The Department for Education aims for these schools to open as 
sponsored academies within nine months of the Inadequate rating. However, the process of 
matching the school to a sponsor and re-opening as an academy can be complicated and take a 
long time, especially in cases where there are no available sponsors nearby. In August 2019 
there were 170 schools still open whilst under a DAO (Gov.uk 2019b). 
 
2.3.2 Academies 
In the case of an Inadequate school already in a Trust, the Regional Schools Commissioner may 
decide that the only resort is to insist that they are ‘re-brokered’. This term is used where an 
Academy Trust is asked by the RSC to transfer one, some or all of its academies to a different 
Academy Trust. The underlying reason for the re-brokerage will normally be as a result of 
serious concerns about performance at one or more of the academies within the Trust, caused 
by for example geographical difficulties, a breakdown in the relationship between the 
academy’s local governing body and the main Trust board, or, as is the case in the context we 







2.3.3 Headteacher Boards 
Headteacher boards (HTBs) are responsible for advising and challenging Regional Schools 
Commissioners on academy-related decisions. Each RSC is supported by their own HTB for their 
region. The role of HTB members is to provide advice, scrutiny and challenge to the RSCs’ 
decision making (DfE, 2020a). One aim of the HTB is to allow a level of transparency to their 
decision-making process and as such they publicise their meeting agendas and meeting notes 
onto the Gov.uk, online 2021c. We return to HTBs with regards the Khalsa Secondary Academy 




2.4 Numbers of schools re-brokered or converted 
 
The following tables (tables 1-3) show how many inadequate schools were re-brokered or 
converted in the academic years 2017-8, 2018-19 and 2019-20 broken down by school type and 
faith. As outlined in section 2.1, no state-funded Hindu, Orthodox Jewish, Quaker or other 
minority religious schools inspected from September 2017 to August 2020 were found to be 
Inadequate by Ofsted.  
 
2.4.1 Inadequate faith schools 
Read & Bernal (2020) have an excellent analysis of DfE and Ofsted data showing in detail the 
numbers of state-funded schools with a faith designation that were rated as Inadequate in the 
period September 2017 – August 2020, and the numbers that have been converted or re-









According to the Department for Education, the decision to re-broker is often the final option 
for the RSC where other methods of intervention, for example issuing warning notices or 
requesting that the trust seek improvement support, have not worked.  
 
The Regional Schools Commissioner may seek to re-broker an academy as a method of school 
intervention in three situations: 
 
1. the academy is rated as inadequate by OFSTED 
2. the academy is ‘coasting’ 
3. the trust has failed to comply with a Termination Warning Notice (TWN) issued 





Table 2: the number of faith schools graded Inadequate, and the numbers that converted to 
Academies and were re-brokered, Sept 2017 – Aug 2020 
 Catholic Other Christian Jewish 
Number of schools graded inadequate 45 85 2 
Number of schools converted  14 43 1 
Number of schools re-brokered 0 6 0 
Total 14 49 1 
percentage converted 31% 51% 50% 
percentage re-brokered 0% 7% 0% 
 
Please note this table excludes data from the year 2019-20, since many of the schools judged 
inadequate during this period may still be in the process of re-brokerage or conversion, 
especially in the light of the pandemic. 
 
A total of 58% of Christian (excluding Roman Catholic) schools judged Inadequate since 
September 2017 have been re-brokered or converted, and 31% of Roman Catholic schools 
judged Inadequate since September 2017 have been re-brokered or converted. It is worth 
noting that not a single Inadequate Roman Catholic academy has been re-brokered in the last 
three academic years. 
 
2.4.2 Inadequate Sikh schools 
Our analysis of DfE and Ofsted data shows that in the same period, 2 state-funded schools with 
a Sikh religious designation were graded Inadequate by Ofsted. The outcomes of the RSC 
decisions on re-brokering were the catalyst for the commissioning of this report, and we will 
return to these schools in Section 4. 
 







Whilst not included in the sample for this study, it is worth noting the inspection outcomes 
for non-association independent faith schools. Ofsted inspects roughly half of independent 
schools in England. According to Ofsted (2017 p. 62): ‘’inspection outcomes for independent 
faith schools remain substantially weaker than independent non-faith schools... Nearly a 
quarter of all faith schools were judged inadequate at their most recent standard inspection’’. 
Also, there is variation across the different faith groups. Less than 50% of Jewish schools were 
judged Good or Outstanding at their most recent inspection compared with 63% of Christian 





2.5 Research into the issues of faith schools and re-
brokerage 
 
Underlying this research and the necessity for it is the assumption by Ofsted, the DfE and the 
government that re-brokering works, but there are grounds to challenge this.  
 
As described earlier, there is very little research in any of these areas. The number of schools 
rated Inadequate is a small percentage of all schools, and the number of academies that 
eventually get re-brokered is even smaller, and the numbers of these that are faith schools is 
smaller yet: down to the statistically insignificant: of the 21,776 state-funded schools, 871 – just 
4% – are rated Inadequate, and less than a quarter of these are designated as having a religious 
character. When it comes to the individual faiths, the numbers become almost useless to draw 
conclusions from. The little research that is available is inconclusive at best. There is no clear 
evidence, for example, that re-brokering schools makes any difference. 
 
Andrews (2018, online), for example, writing for the Educational Policy Institute, found that 
“schools that have moved trusts tend to achieve lower outcomes than other schools and are 
less likely to be amongst the highest performing schools. The group of schools that have moved 
trust at some point achieved an average Progress 8 score of -0.2, meaning that they achieve 
around a fifth of a grade lower than pupils with similar prior attainment nationally.” As he 
notes, however, this result cannot be taken as a reflection on the effectiveness of the re-
brokerage policy: “In a lot of cases, academies were moved precisely because they were 
underperforming so it is not surprising to see that they have results that are below average.” 
His conclusion does not help further the DfE cause: “a more detailed analysis is needed before 
we are able to draw a causal link between re-brokerage and improving outcomes, particularly 
as schools with low outcomes tend to achieve the greatest improvements regardless of 
intervention.” 
 
Further to this, the Education Select Committee minutes from 27th February 2017 
(Parliament.uk), when discussing the performance of multi-academy trusts, note that re-
brokerage should be applied “where school leaders with a track record of success can apply 
proven models to improve performance” but that “of the 277 academies rated as Inadequate 
from 2010 to 2015, just 84 have been re-brokered”. As at 4 January 2017 there were 41 
academies in the process of being re-brokered. Of these, 31 are as a result of intervention 
action on the part of the Regional School Commissioner (RSC).  
 
David Moran from E-Act spoke to the Select Committee of his first-hand account of the re-
brokering of schools from his trust: “I think the timing of re-brokerage is critical. The impact on 
the culture within the organisation during that re-brokerage period was difficult at the school 
level for individual teachers, principals and parents. There was the sense of not knowing what 
was happening and who they were going to, and there was the question of the sensible timing 





Lucy Heller, Chief Executive of Ark Academy Trust, was “critical of the Department’s focus on a 
‘swift transfer’ from one school to another.” Professor Merryn Hutchings told the Committee 
that “the re-brokerage process is still an unknown and that we have little evidence on how 
successful re-brokering is for under-performing schools.” She expressed particular concern for 
schools which are “constantly re-brokered.”  
 
Ehren & Godfrey (2017) discuss five academies that were eventually re-brokered into new 
Trusts following poor results from Ofsted inspections and the subsequent monitoring visits. 
They note that the views of the RSC were central to these decisions. According to the 
headteacher of one of the schools being re-brokered, the analysis of the RSCs did not always 
offer “the best solution” as the RSC would only look for a ‘safe option’ in choosing one of the 
larger MATs, instead of going for a smaller local alternative of a small MAT that had similar 
systems in place. The Headteacher feels her school was pushed into another large MAT and 
now has to start over in implementing new systems which she describes as ‘a setback’” (Ehren 
& Godfey, 2017, online). 
 
Ehren & Godfey (2017) further discuss the need for greater clarity in these procedures, 
particularly of the criteria used to re-broker schools. Simon, James and Simon (2021) indicate 
from their research data that the processes for brokering and re-brokering underperforming 
schools to sponsoring academies lacks transparency. Although there is a framework for 
Regional School Commissioners’ decision-making (DfE, 2020b), there is no guidance on the level 
of Notice they should issue in specific circumstances. We return to this in several sections. In 
the light of our previous discussion on the Memoranda of Understanding and the concerns we 
express in Section 3.1 about the levels of security seemingly enjoyed by Church schools through 
these MoU, we concur with this call for greater clarity, and add our own for greater 
understanding of the seeming lack of equality for all schools whose Trusts do not have such an 
MoU with the DfE. 
 
 
3. Inadequate faith academies: notices from the 
Department for Education 
 
3.1 Notices and Church of England and Catholic 
academies 
 
The Memoranda of Understanding agreed between the DfE and the Church of England (CofE) 
and the Roman Catholic Church (RC) outline the protocol for issuing a termination warning 
notice or termination notice to these types of faith academy. Where the Regional Schools 
Commissioner intends to issue one of these Notices, it must first notify the CofE or RC diocesan 




notified, church representatives have the opportunity to review the contents of Notices, and 
present all the actions they intend to take in order to remedy the failings of the relevant 
academy. The RSC will then look at the proposals for actions put forward, and based on those 
proposals, will decide whether to take action. 
 
Faith schools without an agreed MoU with the Department for Education (e.g. Jewish, Muslim, 
Sikh, Hindu and others) receive Notices from the DfE in the same way as academies with no 
designated religious character. The extent to which the agreed MoU for CofE and RC schools 
affords a level of protection against academy re-brokerage in comparison with other faith 
schools is something which was highlighted by Read & Bernal (2020) as needing to be further 
researched. We also believe that this is something that may be worth further discussion 
within the DfE, as it may lead to misconstrual and misconceptions around equality and 
discrimination. 
 
3.2 Memoranda of Understanding 
 
 
The Commons briefing paper on Schools Inspections in England refers to this same text, and 
notes that “local authorities have no general power to intervene in academy or free schools 
rated inadequate. However, the Education and Skills Funding Agency (ESFA), the Regional 
Schools Commissioner (RSC) or the Secretary of State for Education may intervene in these 
schools” (Roberts & Hill, 2020, p13). Interestingly, this paper makes no mention of the 
Memoranda of Understanding that exist between the DfE and the Church of England and the 
Roman Catholic Church (DfE, 2016a and b). It does refer to the Schools Causing Concern 
document (DfE, 2019), wherein we find: 
 
As set out in the Education and Adoption Act, regardless of the terms in an academy’s 
funding agreement, the RSC (on behalf of the Secretary of State) can terminate the 
funding agreement of an academy that has been judged inadequate. This is a power rather 
than a duty, meaning the RSC may decide to implement other measures to improve the 
school, rather than terminate its funding agreement, to bring about a change of trust, for 
example, where a change of academy trust would prevent the consolidation of 
improvements in a school. […]  
 
When an academy has been judged inadequate, the RSC may identify a new academy trust 
to take on responsibility for the academy, and will enter into a new funding agreement in 
respect of that academy (this is sometimes referred to as an academy transfer). RSCs will 
assess these cases on an individual basis, and may not effect a transfer. If the academy 
that was judged inadequate was previously a ‘standalone’ academy, this will generally 
mean it will join a strong trust that has been assessed as having the capacity to improve 
the school. The academy will continue to function, and the RSC and the new academy trust 
will work to ensure minimal disruption to pupils’ education during the transition. In some 
exceptional cases, where the academy is not considered viable in the long term, the RSC 
can move to terminate the funding agreement in order to close it. 
 






These Memoranda each discuss what intervention following an Inadequate grading will look 
like. In the case of local authority maintained Catholic schools, the RSC “will contact the 
Diocesan Schools Commissioner at the earliest opportunity, to discuss with the Diocese an 
appropriate solution, recognising the additional legal duties which are imposed when an 
Academy Order is made”, and “any solution regarding the appropriate support to be provided 
will be arrived at following full consultation and with the agreement of the Diocese” (DfE 
2016a, p9). There is a clear acknowledgement that any solution must ensure the protection of 
the religious character of the school, and that the Catholic Church must retain control of 
governance, in accordance with canon law. The DfE also acknowledges that sponsorship 
arrangements following the mandatory academisation after an Inadequate grading must ensure 
that control of the school, particularly through the governance arrangements, remains with the 
Catholic Church. The wording is very similar for the MoU signed with the Church of England. 
 
“Where a sponsored Catholic academy is underperforming and, in the view of the RSC, requires 
urgent remedial action, the RSC will engage with the Diocese, through the Diocesan Schools 
Commissioner at the earliest opportunity” (DfE 2016a, p9). The first choice would be for 
another Diocesan or strong Catholic school-led MATs with capacity to take on a Catholic school 
that needs re-brokering. If this is not possible, the RSC will work explicitly with the Diocese to 
agree alternative arrangements but will ensure that the control of the school remains with the 
Catholic Church at all times. Again, this is very similar to the CofE MoU.  
 
As soon as any concerns have come to the attention of the RSC which might lead to the issue of 
a Termination or Termination Warning Notice to the governing body of a maintained Catholic 
school the RSC will engage with and consult the Diocesan Schools Commissioner. This is to 
allow for action to be taken by the Diocese, as necessary, to avoid the need for any notice to 
be served. It is similar for the Church of England, as below: 
 
 
The Government is committed to protecting the ethos of schools with a religious character, 
and RSCs will ensure that their intervention arrangements safeguard the religious character 
and ethos of such schools, working closely with the relevant religious body. For all Church of 
England and Roman Catholic schools, this guidance should be read alongside the relevant 
Memorandum of Understanding, which describes in further detail how RSCs and dioceses will 
work together to address underperformance concerns in those schools. 
 
DfE, Schools causing concern, September 2019, p11. 
Where the RSC issues a Termination Notice, or a Termination Warning Notice to a church academy 
(in accordance with the process set out in the academy’s funding agreement with the Secretary of 
State and as set out in any Church Supplemental Agreement) the RSC will notify the DBE of their 
intention to act, and their reasons for doing so. The RSC will then allow the DBE a reasonable 
opportunity to make representations, including describing any actions the DBE intends to take to 
remedy any failing of the academy, to which the RSC will have due regard before finally taking any 
action. 
 
DfE, Memorandum of understanding between the National Society and the Department for 





It is clear from these MoU, then, that Church schools enjoy a level of protection and an extra 
layer of support where the Diocese can step in and offer remedial action on behalf of the 
school that is not available to non-Church schools and, crucially in this instance, other faith 
academies.  
 
Even if the remaining minority faith schools banded together (which is problematic in several 
ways), and found a voice (we would envisage further difficulties here in having a coherent and 
agreed voice) we imagine they would still be too small a group for the DfE to enter into a MoU 
with. This again is problematic. 
 
There is also the issue of the protection of the religious character of the school during re-
brokerage, which we will return to in section 4.3. 
 




Only two Termination Notices were issued to Inadequate faith academies in the period 
September 2017 – August 2020. These Termination Notices were both sent to Sikh schools. No 
other termination notices were sent to any other faith academies in this same period. Figure 1 
shows the Number of inadequate faith academies issued with DfE notices in the period Sept 







The Department for Education issued a total of 21 Notices to faith academies graded Inadequate 
by Ofsted in the period September 2017 to August 2020. As demonstrated in Figure 2, 6 of these 
notices were sent to Inadequate Roman Catholic academies, 9 were sent to Inadequate Christian 
(excluding Roman Catholic) academies, and 6 notices were sent to Inadequate Sikh academies. No 
Jewish or other minority religious academies received any notices. 
 
The least severe notices, the pre-warning Minded to Terminate Notices were the largest number 
of notices issued in this period, with 4 sent to Inadequate Roman Catholic academies, 4 to 
Inadequate Christian (excluding Roman Catholic) academies and 2 to Inadequate Sikh academies. 
A total of 9 Termination Warning Notices were sent to schools, with 2 sent to Inadequate Roman 
Catholic academies, 5 sent to Inadequate Christian (excluding Catholic) academies, and 2 sent to 




Figure 1: Number of inadequate faith academies issued with DfE notices in the period Sept 




3.4 Notices issued during the UK lockdown period 
March-July 2020 
 
During the lockdowns forced by the Covid-19 pandemic between March and July 2020, the 
Department for Education sent Notices in relation to poor or inadequate performance, or 
weaknesses in safeguarding, governance or financial management to 8 academies: 4 schools 
were sent Minded to Terminate pre-warning notices, and 3 schools were sent Termination 
Warning notices. Only one school, Khalsa Secondary Academy, received the DfE’s most severe 
notice, a Termination Notice. Of the 8 schools which received notices during the period March 
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4. The treatment of Sikh schools 
 
Figure 2 demonstrates the outcomes of all decisions on Termination Notices sent to faith 
schools in the period September 2017 – Aug 2020. 
 
Figure 2: summary of DFE decisions regarding Termination Notices by faith schools 
 
Number of State-Funded Schools rated as ‘Inadequate’ 
 Catholic 
Other 
Christian Jewish Sikh Muslim Hindu 
2017-2018 21 34 1 1 1 0 
2018-2019 17 40 1 0 0 0 
2019-2020 7 11 0 1 0 0 
Total 45 85 2 2 1 0 
% of schools rated Inadequate as % of total faith schools by religion and period Sept 2017 – Aug 2020 
 Catholic 
Other 
Christian Jewish Sikh Muslim Hindu 
 2% 1% 4% 15% 3% 0% 
No of Inadequate Faith Academies issued with DfE notices in period Sept 2017 – Aug 2020 
 Catholic 
Other 
Christian Jewish Sikh Muslim Hindu 
Minded to Terminate 4 4 0 2 0 0 
Termination Warning Notice 2 5 0 2 0 0 
Termination Notice 0 0 0 2 0 0 
*Note MTT/TW/TN figures do not include maintained schools that were converted/re-brokered 
% of schools judged Inadequate that were issued with a TWN/TN 
 Catholic 
Other 
Christian Jewish Sikh Muslim Hindu 
Minded to Terminate 8.9% 4.7% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Termination Warning Notice 4.4% 5.9% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Termination Notice 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
 
4.1 A Sikh Academy, and a Roman Catholic Academy: a 
direct comparison of Ofsted comments 
 
The following table gives the opening remarks from two Inadequate gradings within two 
months of each other – the Khalsa Secondary Academy (a Sikh school) in early December 2019 
and the de la Salle Academy (a Roman Catholic school) in January 2020. A further discussion 
follows. Throughout the table, positive remarks are in normal font and negative are in italics, 







De la Salle Roman Catholic Academy Khalsa Secondary Academy 
Pupils have been failed for far too long at The De 
La Salle Academy. Leaders and trustees have not 
done enough to improve the school. 
Across the school, pupils’ achievement is 
exceptionally low in too many subjects. Current 
pupils have extremely wide gaps in their knowledge 
and understanding. Leaders and teachers do not 
expect enough from pupils.  
Pupils have very weak mathematical skills. In 2019, 
pupils’ attainment in mathematics declined to an 
all-time low. Current pupils are not faring any 
better.  
Owing to financial issues, too many pupils have 
experienced a very narrow curriculum. Although art, 
drama, geography and technology have now been 
reintroduced, many pupils missed out on learning 
these subjects from Year 7. Music is still not offered.  
There is a deep-rooted culture of poor attendance, 
particularly for disadvantaged pupils and pupils 
with special educational needs and/or disabilities 
(SEND). This prevents these pupils from learning and 
achieving well.  
Pupils’ behaviour has improved over time. Leaders 
have successfully established a culture where pupils 
can now learn. Relationships between teachers and 
pupils are positive. However, some pupils do not 
behave well at social times. 
Pupils told us that bullying is dealt with effectively 
and that they feel safe. Pupils appreciate the 
extensive range of extra-curricular opportunities on 
offer, including sports, chess and the cadets. They 
enjoy taking part in charity work and educational 
visits. Pupils’ personal development is very strong. 
Many pupils are very happy at Khalsa 
Secondary Academy (KSA). Pupils typically 
work hard at KSA, enjoy their time there, 
and feel safe. However, leaders have not 
made sure that pupils are safe. Leaders at 
trust and school level have not followed 
essential safeguarding processes when 
recruiting staff. The designated safeguarding 
leads (DSLs) care about pupils but have not 
helped some vulnerable pupils as quickly or 
effectively as they should.  
Leaders express high ambition for pupils 
and, overall, pupils do well in their GCSEs. 
However, some pupils with special 
educational needs and/or disabilities (SEND) 
do not do well because they do not get the 
support that they require. Teachers do not 
know what pupils’ specific needs are and so 
do not make adjustments for them. Some 
pupils with SEND do not have access to the 
range of subjects available to others. 
Pupils focus on GCSE examinations from Year 
7. They follow a reduced two-year key stage 
3. This does not provide them with similar 
breadth of learning to the national 
curriculum. 
Pupils behave well and are polite and 
welcoming to visitors. They do not see 
bullying as an issue and feel that the school 
deals well with any instances that arise. 
Pupils appreciate the wide range of 
enrichment activities which teachers put on 
for them. Those who are elected to the 
school council are proud to represent their 
peers. 
 
It should be immediately apparent which is a worse place to be taught. The report for de la Salle 
continues, “Since the previous inspection, leaders and trustees have failed to address all of the 
areas for improvement left at the last inspection. They have not demonstrated the capacity to 
improve the school at the pace required. In particular, leaders have been unable to improve 
pupils’ academic outcomes. Pupils’ achievement across the school is exceptionally poor.  
The achievement of disadvantaged pupils and pupils with SEND is unacceptable. In 2019, 
hardly any disadvantaged pupils achieved a standard pass in English, mathematics or science. 





The report for the Khalsa Academy also lists a series of faults, but some of these are 
acknowledged to be recognised and beginning to be dealt with: 
 The special educational needs coordinator (SENCo) is aware that the school’s approach 
to identifying additional needs is not effective. 
 There is no library, so English teachers have created classroom book boxes with their 
own and donated books. However, these are of varying quality and are uninspiring. To 
address this gap in provision, subject leaders have constructed a reading list, delivered 
assemblies about reading and arranged commercial book fairs at school. They plan to 
introduce further resources in 2020 but recognise this is currently a significant gap in 
provision for pupils. 
 Leaders at the school are working hard. Many have stepped up to try to fill gaps in 
leadership. However, they do not have the training or support that they need to be 
effective in these roles. 
 
Two key areas in which the Khalsa Secondary Academy was found to be inadequate by Ofsted 
were regarding its Safeguarding policies and processes, and Leadership and Management, with 
clear areas of concern identified by Ofsted, and extremely clear guidance given as to how to 
improve these fundamental areas. 
 
The RSC were first involved in talks with the Khalsa Secondary Academy towards the end of 
October 2019 and were subsequently issued with a Minded to Terminate Notice on the 2nd 
December 2019.  The following day an inspection was carried out by Ofsted and this resulted in 
an Inadequate rating. On the basis of this rating the RSC then issued a Termination Warning 
Notice on the 18th February 2021. Although supporting evidence was submitted to the RSC by 
Khalsa Secondary Academy regarding progress made in response to the Ofsted report, the RSC 
dismissed this and further issued a Termination notice on the 4th June 2021. We also note that 
that an Ofsted section 8 monitoring visit was carried out remotely on the 20th November 2020 
and reported that “We did not find any significant concerns during the visit”. (the remote 
inspection letter of 4th December 2020 available here: 
https://files.ofsted.gov.uk/v1/file/50158385).  
 
The de la Salle Academy also received the lesser Minded to Terminate Notice despite its 
seemingly larger set of failings. Hill (2008) and Greany & Ehren (2016) have written of the need 
for greater clarity as to the criteria for the decisions around the levels of Notice that are sent 
to schools. Is there clear guidance for RSCs, or is the decision entirely at their discretion? Is 
Safeguarding the trigger for the higher level of notice? It would seem not, as the Notice sent to 
the Saint Augustine Webster Catholic Voluntary Academy in North Lincolnshire in October 2020 
specifically mentions Safeguarding as its primary concern, yet this is the lowest severity Notice. 
We note that the concerns raised about Safeguarding are not as pronounced as those at KSA, 
but we reiterate a call for clarity here. We also note Leadership and Management is also 
highlighted as a failing at de la Salle Academy but no further Notice has been issued to them. 
 
Furthermore, the MTN to de la Salle Academy prompted by an Inadequate grade given in 




failed to make progress in those 26 months, giving it the lowest warning seems hard to 
justify. What factors prompted the RSC and the DfE to respond in this way? Has the 
Memorandum of Understanding prevented a different judgement being made, despite the lack 
of progress in the period in question?  
 
As we noted in Section 2.5, we cannot be sure that re-brokerage is effective in raising 
standards, but even if that were proven we are concerned about the consistency of approach 
from Regional School Commissioners. There is no way of judging this, given such small 
statistical numbers, but the Termination Notices given to KSA seems an extreme reaction when 
compared to the de la Salle Academy. We have found no clear guidance for RSCs to support 
their decision-making processes beyond the simple framework already discussed (DfE, 2020b), 
nor for the HTBs that exist to “advise and challenge RSCs on the decisions they make” (Academy 
Ambassadors, 2021). We suggest that, if this exists, it is shared with schools and the 
educational establishment more generally. There is no research into the levels of subjectivity 
and context in these re-brokerage decisions, but there is a reasonable body of literature about 
subjectivity and Ofsted inspections (e.g. Ball & Olmedo, 2012; Ball, 2016) on which we can draw 
to raise similar concerns about the re-brokerage process. 
 
 
4.2 Questions following this discussion 
We are left with a series of questions which we feel need answering. Our strong suggestion 
would be for greater clarity around these areas to anticipate and disarm any accusations of 





1. What guidance do Regional Schools Commissioners receive to support their decision-
making processes regarding the level of Notice to serve schools with an Inadequate 
grading? 
2. Is Safeguarding alone the key trigger for a Termination Notice? 
3. To what extent do the Headteacher Boards have any influence on these outcomes? 
4. How is parity ensured between regional Headteacher Board decisions in the different 
regions? Is there training given or guidance issued to these bodies? 
5. How representative is the composition of the RSC body? Does it reflect the diversity in 
the UK and the local communities which they serve? How well do the eight members 
understand the nuances of faith on which they make decisions about potential 
sponsoring MATs? 
6. To what extent do the Memoranda of Understanding protect failing Catholic and CofE 




4.3 Keeping the religious character of Khalsa Secondary 
Academy 
 
Should the re-brokerage of KSA be forced through, despite the aforementioned Ofsted remote 
visit in November 2020 finding no significant concerns, we feel it imperative to raise the issue of 
the keeping of the religious character of the school. As noted above, the DfE (2020c) report on 
Schools Causing Concern states that “The Government is committed to protecting the ethos of 
schools with a religious character, and RSCs will ensure that their intervention arrangements 
safeguard the religious character and ethos of such schools, working closely with the relevant 
religious body” (p.11) however, the Regional Schools Commissioner has indicated that KSA is to 
be taken over by the Sikh Academies Trust. This is of grave concern to the Khalsa Academies 
Trust for reasons of nuances of faith that we feel are overlooked or inadequately understood. 
At the very least, not enough consideration seems to have been given to these concerns. It is 
notable that the RSC decision-making framework (October 2020) has no mention or stated 
provision for such nuances in faith. We suggest that this should always be an item of 
discussion with Trust boards in these situations so as to avoid unnecessary distress.  
 
The Regional Schools Commissioner has indicated that KSA is to be taken over by the Sikh 
Academies Trust. This is of grave concern to the Khalsa Academies Trust for exactly these 
reasons of nuances of faith that we feel are overlooked or inadequately understood. At the 
very least, not enough consideration seems to have been given to these concerns. We suggest 
that this should always be an item of discussion with Trust boards in these situations so as to 
avoid unnecessary distress. 
 
The issue in this specific circumstance is that we have been informed that the sponsoring school 
that is looking to receive KSA and its larger Trust are run by Sikhs affiliated to the Akhand Kirtani 
Jatha (AKJ). This is a separate jatha, or collective group, of Sikhs perhaps best understood as a 
sect. Whilst describing itself as fully aligned with the Khalsa Panth, there are nuances of faith 
between the AKJ and what might be described as mainstream Sikhism. 
 
This is not the place for a theological discussion; the point is rather that the Board of Trustees at 
the Khalsa Academies Trust feel that moving the school to a Trust affiliated with the AKJ would 
be grossly inappropriate. Whilst not a direct comparison, it would be obviously inappropriate to 
expect a Sunni-aligned academy to join a Shia Trust, or a Catholic school to be forced to merge 
into, or be sponsored by, e.g. a Methodist Trust. The Khalsa Academies Trust suggest that what 
is being suggested here amounts to a similar situation. This raises the question of the level of 
local, contextual and religious knowledge of the Regional Schools Commissioner whose task it is 
to decide on the sponsors of failing schools needing re-brokerage. What support do they 
receive in these areas? We strongly suggest that investigations should be opened into local 
contexts in re-brokerage situations, especially where schools with a distinctive religious 





We feel it appropriate here to again raise the question of the diversity and levels of 
representation within the eight-person membership of the RSC body, and ask whether they 
could be better supported at local and national level with faith group representation in an 
advisory capacity – perhaps a specific Advisory Board could be drawn together at need in 
situations like this. The Network of Sikh Organisations (www.nsouk.co.uk) run by Lord Singh has 
been at the forefront of opening and supporting Sikh faith schools. They supported Guru Nanak 
School in Hayes which was the first VA Sikh faith School to open in the country in the 1970s. 
Lady Singh leads on the educational aspects of the work of the NSO and is a current Ofsted 
inspector. The NSO are the DFE approved body to carry out Section 48 inspections in Sikh faith 
schools.  
 
From scrutiny of the Headteacher Board (HTB) minutes from the meeting relevant to this 
decision, it can be seen from the August 2020 Agenda that an item to discuss and recommend 
an in-principle preferred sponsor for Khalsa Secondary Academy, Buckinghamshire, following 
the Termination Notice for the school. There is no further evidence in subsequent meeting 
documents that this discussion took place and whether a fair and equitable decision was made. 




5. Conclusions and questions 
 
As Read and Bernal (2020) noted in their initial report, with only two Sikh schools being judged 
Inadequate by Ofsted in the period September 2017 to August 2020, it is not possible to 
perform statistical significance testing by comparing frequencies and proportions between Sikh 
schools and those of other religious designations (particularly those with an agreed MoU with 
the DfE) with regards Inadequate Ofsted ratings, school re-brokerages and conversions, or 
Notices to academies by the DfE. Read and Bernal are correct therefore, that there is no 
statistically significant evidence that Sikh schools have been treated differently by the DfE in 
respect to any of the above. 
 
Despite this, it cannot be ignored that Khalsa Secondary Academy, a designated Sikh religious 
school, was the only faith academy in England to receive any kind of notice from the 
Department for Education during the first UK lockdown period of the pandemic (March to July 
2020). Additionally, it was the only academy in general to receive a Termination Notice during 
the lockdown period; the other academies issued notices during this time received less severe 
warnings (i.e. Minded to Terminate and Termination Warning Notices). Prior to its inadequate 
Ofsted rating in 2019, Khalsa Secondary Academy had been graded as ‘Good’ and a monitoring 
visit, albeit online, was conducted in November 2020 which found no significant concerns. This 
suggests that the safeguarding issues were at least being dealt with if not overcome, as these 
must have been the primary basis for conversation during the discussions with the senior 
leadership team, including the senior leader responsible for safeguarding, the director of school 




Termination warning notice issued by the RSC on 4th June 2020 acknowledges the school’s 
response to safeguarding through the creation of a ‘Rapid Trust Improvement Plan for Keeping 
Children Safe’ which sought to address the shortcomings in safeguarding practice identified by 
Ofsted and a safeguarding audit conducted by Anchored Schools which found safeguarding to 
be effective and that the school had implemented the short term recommendations from this 
audit. 
 
Therefore, the timing of the Termination Notice needs to be thoroughly examined, both in 
terms of it seeming premature when a subsequent remote visit found no significant concerns, 
and it occurring during a period of national lockdown when the staff were struggling with the 
forced shift to online teaching, and many of the concerns were potentially not able to be acted 
on with children not present. A full explanation of the timing and a justification for the 
decision would be welcomed. We do note, however, the extent and gravity of the failings of 




Reid & Bernal’s (2020) analysis highlighted that no Roman Catholic academy was re-brokered to 
another Trust in the period September 2017 – August 2020, despite six Roman Catholic 
academies being issued with notices from the Department for Education (4 Minded to 
Terminate Notices and 2 Termination Warning Notices). As stated above, due to the very low 
numbers of state-funded Jewish, Sikh and other minority religious schools found to be 
Inadequate by Ofsted in the specified time period, it has not been possible to make a 
meaningful comparison between the treatment of faith schools with an agreed MoU with the 
Department for Education (CofE and RC) and faith schools without an agreed MoU, but the lack 
of clarity around the guidelines for re-brokerage, the opacity of the decision-making 
processes, and the potential protections against forced school closures and transfers that the 
Memoranda of Understanding appear to confer on Christian Trusts, all seem open to 
accusations of discrimination. It is our strong recommendation that further research into these 
three areas is conducted, and the decision-making processes and the support for RSCs in 
these decisions are clarified with some urgency. 
 
The case of the de la Salle Academy, which we investigated in section 4.1, illustrates this 
effectively: a school whose “pupils have been failed for far too long,” whose “leaders and 
trustees have not done enough to improve the school” and where the “pupils’ achievement is 
exceptionally low in too many subjects” has been allowed to remain open and potentially affect 
the life chances of its pupils since 2017 with nothing more severe than a Minded to Terminate 
Notice. In contrast, the Khalsa Academies Trust went through the MTN, TWN and full 
Termination Notice between 2nd December 2019 and 4th June 2020. The extent to which the 
MoU between the DfE and the Roman Catholic Church has protected the de la Salle Academy 
from further repercussions is only a source of conjecture, but is clearly a source of possible 
resentment for those schools – of religious character and without – who do not have similar 





We are grateful to Dr Rachel Morgan-Guthrie and Professor Michael Jopling for reading this 
manuscript as an additional layer of peer review, and for their insights and helpful comments. 
MS & SM 
We do not feel we have enough information or the level of contextual understanding needed to 
contest the decision to terminate the funding agreement of the Khalsa Secondary Academy, 
although we do note that two independent initiatives have subsequently been instituted for 
Safeguarding at the school with an independent body judging the school’s safeguarding practice 
to be effective prior to the Termination Notice being issued. We do feel, however, that the 
evidence we have given throughout demonstrates a lack of equality between the treatment 
of the KSA and the de la Salle Academy, leading us again to question the power and 
appropriacy of the Memoranda of Understanding we have discussed. 
 
As we have noted previously, the numbers are so small that it is impossible to make any 





Finally, we again reiterate again here the need for greater clarity in the procedures of the 
Regional Schools Commissioners, particularly of the criteria used to re-broker schools. In the 
light of our discussion on the levels of security enjoyed by Church schools through their 
Memoranda of Understanding, we also repeat our own call for greater understanding of the 
seeming lack of equality for all schools whose Trusts do not have such an MoU with the DfE, 





1. There is very little evidence to support the DfE’s assumption that re-brokerage is effective 
in raising standards, and what research exists is inconclusive at best 
2. What if re-brokerage is not effective? What then for academies who have been forced to 
undergo this process? 
3. There does not seem to be any consistency in the level of Notice sent to schools and 
academies following an Inadequate grading 
4. We could not find any advice for RSCs, not even anything as simple as a flowchart, to 
support their decision-making processes, nor those of the advisory Headteacher Boards 
5. This level of subjectivity and opacity does not lead to confidence 
6. To what level do the MoU between Catholic and CofE schools and the DfE allow 
protection to failing schools with Christian characteristics, and deny it to those schools 
without such MoU? 
7. Is there effective representation within the composition of the Regional Schools 
Commissioners? Do they reflect the diversity of the UK population or local community for 
which they serve? 
8. Do the RSC and the HTB understand the nuances of faith well enough to appropriately 
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